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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is a petition for review of a NPDES permit issued under
the Clean Water Act by the EPA Region XII. Petitioners Fossil
Creek Watchers, Inc., and Enerprog, L.L.C., filed timely petitions
for review of the permit with the Environmental Appeals Board
(EAB) pursuant to 40 C.F.R. section 124. Upon the EAB issuing its
order, both petitioners filed timely petitions to this Court. This
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 33 U.S.C.
section 1369(b).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Whether, where Congress expressly intended for
independent state authority over water pollution discharge,
the Clean Water Act’s state certification provision allows for
a state to certify a NPDES permit on the condition that the
polluter close and remediate a substandard coal ash pond as
required by state law.

II.

Whether the April 25, 2017 EPA Notice, suspending future
compliance deadlines for a properly promulgated rule (2015
Final Effluent Limitation Guidelines) without an
opportunity for public comment is effective to require the
suspension of the permit compliance deadlines for achieving
zero discharge of coal ash transport water.

III.

Whether the EPA could rely on Best Professional Judgment
as an alternative ground to require zero discharge of coal ash
transport wastes, when the applicable effluent limitation
guideline did not apply to pollutants addressed by the zero
discharge requirement.

IV.

Whether National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
permit requirements apply to discharges into a waste
containment system located in a water of the United States,
where:
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A. An agency action exempting such waste systems from
the definition of waters of the United States was
promulgated in violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act; and
B. The waste treatment system is substandard
presenting a heightened risk of pollution discharges
into a navigable in-fact river.
V.

Whether the Clean Water Act requires a dredge and fill
permit for the closure and capping of an ash pond, where the
existing ash will remain in place and the waterbody, before
the dam and pond were built, was a perennial tributary to a
nearby navigable in-fact river.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a petition for judicial review of an Environmental
Appeals Board (EAB) decision denying review of a Clean Water Act
(CWA) National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permit renewal issued by Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Region XII. R. at 2. In addition to authorizing EnerProg, L.L.C.
(EnerProg) to continue its water pollution discharges at its
Moutard Electric Generating Station (MEGS), a coal-fired steam
electric plant located in Fossil, Progress, the permit included
limitations that would update the MEGS facility to 21st century
standards. Id. However, as required by the CWA, prior to the EPA
issuing the NPDES permit, the State of Progress provided a water
quality certification, which contained certain permit approval
conditions. Id. Progress certified the permit on the condition that
EnerProg close and remediate its coal ash pond in compliance with
Progress’ Coal Ash Cleanup Act (CACA). Id. The petitioners, Fossil
Creek Watchers (FCW) and EnerProg, appealed the EPA’s
issuance of the NPDES permit on separate grounds. R. at 2-3. In
addition to Progress’ conditions, in accordance with the EPA’s 2015
Effluent Limitation Guidelines (ELGs), the NPDES permit
required that the plant implement a zero-discharge requirement
for coal ash disposal. R at 9.
However, EnerProg, objected to the NPDES permit’s inclusion
of the conditions claiming: 1) The inclusion of Progress’ CACA
certification conditions as permit requirements are not sufficiently
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related to achieving water quality standards and require EPA
review; 2) that the EPA’s April 25, 2017 notice that purports to
extend compliance deadlines for the 2015 Steam Electric Power
Generating Point Source ELGs, relieves it from complying with the
permit’s November 1, 2018 zero discharge compliance deadline;
and 3) that the EPA may not rely on best professional judgment
(BPJ) as an alternative ground for zero discharge of ash pollution.
R. at 11. Conversely, FCW opposes EnerProg’s arguments and
additionally alleges that since the ash pond is in the former
streambed of Fossil Creek, a perennial tributary to a navigable infact river, it is a water of the United States (WOTUS) and
discharge into the ash pond is subject to section 402 requirements.
R. at 12. Further, FCW argues that the plan to close and cap the
coal ash pond necessitates a section 404 fill permit. Id.
A. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The MEGS facility is a coal power plant in Fossil, Progress,
that has one unit with a maximum capacity of 745 megawatts. R.
at 7. The coal plant relies on the Moutard Reservoir for its
operational and drinking water needs, withdrawing nearly 125
million gallons a day, as well as its final point of pollution
discharge. R. at 8. In 1978, EnerProg dammed the upper reach of
the then free-flowing Fossil Creek, a perennial tributary to the
navigable-in-fact Progress River to create the ash pond for the
MEGS facility. R. at 7. The upper reach of Fossil Creek’s streambed
is now filled with toxic coal ash byproducts such as mercury,
arsenic, and selenium. Id. Due to an EPA action in 1980 that
suspended waste treatment ponds located in a WOTUS from being
defined as a WOTUS, Fossil Creek’s WOTUS status was effectively
stripped away. R. at 12; Consolidated Permit Regulations, 45 Fed.
Reg. 48620-01 (July 21, 1980).
The MEGS ash pond is the pollution receptacle for the MEGS
facility. R. at 8-9. The pond receives pollutants from several
outfalls, including: two internal outfalls (Outfall 008 and
and various low volume sources, with Outfall 008 containing
bottom ash and fly ash transport water, and the cooling tower
blowdown; Outfall 009, with flue gas desulfurization (FGD)
wastewater and heavy concentrations of metals and chloride that’s
treated by the vapor compression evaporator before entering the
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ash pond; and other pollutant sources, such as coal pile runoff,
stormwater runoff, and wastes such as boiler blowdown, oily waste
treatment, wastes/backwash from the water treatment processes
including Reverse-Osmosis (RO) wastewater, plant area wash
down water, landfill leachate, monofill leachate, equipment heat
exchanger water, groundwater, yard sump overflows, occasional
piping leakage from limestone slurry and the FGD system, and
treated domestic wastewater. Id.
MEGS uses the ash pond to treat the above waste streams by
sedimentation before discharging directly into Moutard Reservoir
through Outfall 002. R. at 7-8. MEGS also discharges water used
in the coal plant’s cooling tower system into the Moutard Reservoir
about once per year. R. at 8. While heavier sediments are settled
out in the ash pond before entering Moutard Reservoir, many toxic
pollutants cannot be treated by sedimentation alone. R. at 9. Thus,
the ash pond effluent discharged into the Moutard Reservoir
contains elevated levels of toxic pollutants such as mercury,
arsenic, and selenium. Id.
To continue its pollution discharges into the Moutard
Reservoir, EnerProg applied for renewal of its federal NPDES
permit under the requirements of the CWA section 402. R. at 6.
Prior to the EPA issuing renewal of a NPDES permit, the CWA
requires the State of Progress to issue a certification and that
NPDES permit include Effluent Limitation Guidelines (ELGs) Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, per 40
C.F.R. section 423. R. at 8. Incorporating these requirements, on
January 18, 2017, under section 402 of the CWA, the EPA issued
a NPDES permit to EnerProg authorizing continued water
pollution discharges into the Moutard Reservoir, on the condition
that EnerProg close and remediate its substandard coal ash pond
and institute zero discharge methods for coal ash disposal. R. at 6.
The state of Progress issued its certification contingent on the
closure and remediation of EnerProg’s ash pond. R at 8. Clean-up
of EnerProg’s ash pond is necessary to comply with the CACA, a
state-enacted law that requires assessment, closure, and
remediation of substandard coal ash disposal facilities in the State
of Progress. R. at 8. CACA has a specific purpose to prevent public
hazards associated with the failures of ash treatment pond
containment systems, as well as leaks from treatment ponds into
ground and surface waters. R. at 8-9. In its NPDES certification
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process, Progress deemed EnerProg’s ash pond substandard and
found that closure and remediation was necessary to comply with
CACA. R. at 8. To comply with CACA, Progress imposed the
following conditions on EnerProg: 1) by November 1, 2018
EnerProg must cease operation of its ash pond; 2) complete
dewatering of its ash pond by September 1, 2019; and 3) cover the
ash pond with an impermeable cap by September 1, 2020. R. at 10.
The EPA relied on the applicable 2015 ELG issued by EPA to
require the zero discharge of coal ash transport waters. R. at 9. In
the 2015 Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category
ELGs (2015 ELGs), EPA determined that the best available
technology (BAT) for toxic discharges associated with bottom ash
and fly ash is zero discharge. Id.; Effluent Limitations Guidelines
and Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point
Source Category, 80 Fed. Reg. 67837 (Nov. 3, 2015). The EPA
determined EnerProg was capable of meeting the zero-discharge
requirement by the earliest compliance deadline of November 1,
2018. R. at 9. However, three months after EPA issued EnerProg
the NPDES permit, on April 25, 2017, the EPA Administrator,
Scott Pruitt, postponed the compliance dates of the 2015 ELGs in
a postponement notice. R. at 11; Postponement of Certain
Compliance Dates for Effluent Limitations Guidelines and
Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source
Category, 82 Fed. Reg. 19005 (Apr. 25, 2017). The postponement
notice relied on section 705 to of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), which allows an agency to “postpone the effective date of an
action taken by it, pending judicial review.” R at 11; 82 Fed. Reg.
at 19005; 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2012). The 2015 ELGs are part of ongoing
litigation in the Fifth Circuit. However, the postponement was
issued after the “effective date” of the 2015 ELGs, without notice
and comment, and without referencing the impact of the ongoing
litigation on the ELGs. R. at 12.
Regardless of the status of the 2015 ELGs, the EPA
determined that independent from the 2015 ELGs, the permit
must contain limits for toxic pollutants based on the BAT. R at 9.
EPA determined that zero discharge via dry handling of bottom
ash and fly ash has been in use by many plants in the industry for
years, and that EnerProg is sufficiently profitable to transition by
November 1, 2018. Moreover, EnerProg would likely pass its costs
to consumers “with no more than twelve cents per month increase
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in the average consumer’s electric bill.” R. at 9. Therefore, under
the agency’s BPJ zero discharge should be required. R. at 9.
The final NPDES permit forbid EnerProg from discharging
bottom ash or fly ash transport water into the ash pond by
November 1, 2018, in order to comply with CACA, the 2015 ELG,
and, if necessary, the EPA’s BPJ. R. at 10. EnerProg was also
required by CACA to stop using the ash pond, remediate it, and
create a new retention basin with a liner to deter pollution leaking
into groundwater. R. at 8. The new retention basin would function
as a modern waste treatment pond accepting the same pollutants
minus bottom and fly ash. Id. To ensure that the MEGS facility
complies with CACA and that adequate safeguards are in place to
protect the citizens of Progress from public hazards and water
pollution, these updates to the MEGS outdated coal ash pollution
treatment methods are necessary. R. at 8-9.
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 18, 2017, pursuant to section 402 of the CWA, the
EPA issued a NPDES permit containing Progress’ certification
conditions to EnerProg. R. at 6. The EAB extended the appeal filing
deadline for both parties, and timely petitions were filed on April
1, 2017, with supplemental briefs filed subsequent to the April 25,
2017 Notice of the suspension of the 2015 ELG compliance
deadline. Id. EnerProg challenged the NPDES permit conditions
on several grounds, while FCW challenged that the ash pond and
the closure plan was subject to additional CWA permitting
requirements. R. at 11-12.
The EAB denied both appeals and affirmed the NPDES permit
holding that: 1) Ash pond remediation is sufficiently related to
water quality and, therefore, Progress’ certification conditions are
properly included in the NPDES permit, and regardless, EPA has
no discretion to reject a condition included in a State’s 401
certification; 2) the Administrative Procedure Act does not
authorize the extension of compliance dates, only the effective date
of the rule, and that since the effective date of the 2015 ELGs had
already passed, the April 25, 2017 suspension notice had no effect
on the 2015 ELG; 3) the EPA’s reliance on BPJ is appropriate,
regardless of the status of 2015 ELGs, was justified because the
types of pollutants in the ash pond are not subject to ELG
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regulations; 4) that the ash pond was not a WOTUS since a 1980
EPA action suspending ash ponds in streambeds from within the
definition of a WOTUS applies; and 5) that a section 404 permit
was not required for the coal ash pond closure and capping because
the ash pond is not a WOTUS and a recapture provision is not
included in the EPA’s 1980 action.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), the EPA lacks the
authority to review state National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit certification conditions that are necessary
to comply with “appropriate” state law. A large majority of circuit
courts where this issue has been presented have ruled that the
EPA lacks review authority over state NPDES certification
conditions that are similar to Progress’. See infra Part I(A).
Additionally, Progress’ conditions required under the Coal Ash
Cleanup Act (CACA), are “appropriate” state law because as the
Supreme Court ruled and circuit courts clarified, conditions
certifying compliance with “state water protection laws” are at a
minimum considered “appropriate.” S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd.
of Envtl. Protec., 547 U.S. 370, 373 (2006). Therefore, the EAB was
correct in holding that the EPA lacks review authority over
Progress’ appropriate conditions.
The EPA may independently rely on EPA’s 2015 Effluent
Limitation Guidelines (ELGs) to require zero discharge of coal ash.
EPA’s postponement action of the 2015 ELGs compliance dates,
that was after the effective date of the regulation had passed, was
constructively a repeal requiring notice and comment under the
APA. 5 U.S.C. 551(5) (2012). Under the Administrative Procedures
Act (APA), the EPA may postpone the effective date of a rule, not
the compliance date, and section 705 does not allow the suspension
of already promulgate rules. Safety–Kleen Corp. v. EPA, 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS, *2 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 19, 1996). In failing to provide
notice and comment in its postponement, the EPA was in direct
contrast with the APA’s policy to ensure that “an agency will not
undo all that it accomplished through its rulemaking without
giving all parties an opportunity to comment. . . .” Consumer
Energy Council of Am. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d
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425, 446, (D.C. Cir. 1982). Thus, the EAB ruled correctly that the
EPA violated the APA in issuing its postponement action.
The EPA may also independently rely on best professional
judgment (BPJ) to require zero discharge when the applicable ELG
fails to control all pollutants of concern. EPA regulations
specifically allow for a permit writer to regulate pollutants on a
case-by-case basis, if those pollutants were not controlled by an
ELG. 40 C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(1)-(2); 47 Fed. Reg. 52,290. Here,
the 1982 ELG fails to control specific pollutants such as mercury,
arsenic, and selenium. Not allowing the EPA to use BPJ to
determine the appropriate controls would be contrary to the
objectives of the CWA and facially in violation of EPA’s
promulgated regulations. Therefore, the court should find that
EPA may alternatively rely on BPJ to require zero discharge of
bottom ash and fly ash.
Additionally, EnerProg should be required to obtain a NPDES
permit for all discharges into the MEGS ash pond because the EPA
violated the APA in suspending CWA jurisdiction from such ponds
and the pond should independently be considered a point source.
The EPA’s action in 45 Federal Register 46820 (1980 Suspension),
is contrary to the APA because the APA requires notice and
comment where an agency action effectively rewrites a rule. Nat’l.
Retired Teachers Ass’n v. U. S. Postal Serv., 593 F.2d 1360, 1363
(D.C. Cir. 1979). The EPA’s suspension changes the legal
consequences of industry action and changes the explicit language
of the properly promulgated rule. EPA also failed to have good
cause when it effectively rewrote the regulation because the
industry would not be unduly harmed. The regulation was properly
promulgated with notice and comment, so, the industry had a
chance to object to obligations before the obligations were applied.
Furthermore, EnerProg’s MEGS ash pond should independently be
considered a point source to the Progress River because of its
hydrologic connection to the river. Therefore, any pollutants
discharged into the pond are subject to NPDES permitting
requirements under EPA regulations and the definition of point
source.
EnerProg’s closure and capping plan also requires a section
404 permit because EPA’s 1980 Suspension would not exclude the
ash pond from coverage under the CWA after it was no longer being
used as a “waste containment system.” Once the pond ceases to
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receive discharges from the MEGS facility, the pond can no longer
be considered a “waste treatment system,” thus, in accordance with
the CWA’s objectives to protect and restore the Nation’s waters,
Fossil Creek’s status as a WOTUS must be restored. Additionally,
in past jurisdictional determinations, the USACE has determined
that similar coal ash disposal pond closures implicated section 404
of the CWA. Therefore, the EPA failed to identify the coal ash
dewatering as an action requiring a section 404 permit. EAB
incorrectly held that section 404 does not apply, and this Court
should rule that the EPA was arbitrary and capricious in failing to
require a section 404 permit.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of EPA agency actions has several components.
First, to obtain judicial review of NPDES permits, the petitioner
must first appeal the final agency action to the EAB. 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.19(l)(1) (2017). Second, under APA section 706, where the
agency made factual findings and conclusions, the reviewing Court
shall: “(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be: (A) arbitrary,
capricious, and an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law. . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). Third, where
issues of interpretation of laws arise, the court must determine
whether the agency action complies with the Chevron test. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 847, 842-43
(1984). If it is shown that congress delegated the issue to the
agency, then the Chevron test requires the reviewing court to
determine: (1) whether congress, in writing the law,
unambiguously expressed its intentions; and (2) if ambiguity
exists, “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.” Id. at 842-43.
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ARGUMENT
I.

UNDER THE CWA SECTION 401, FEDERAL
AGENCIES LACK REVIEW AUTHORITY OVER A
STATE’S CERTIFICATION CONDITIONS WHEN
THOSE CONDITIONS ARE NECESSARY TO
COMPLY WITH A STATE LAW AND ARE
RELATED TO WATER QUALITY.

The EAB correctly found that under the CWA, the EPA lacks
discretion to reject a condition included in a CWA section 401 state
certification, and that CACA’s requirements are within the scope
of section 401(d) since they are related to water quality. The CWA
requires polluters to obtain a state certification that a proposed
discharge will comply with the CWA and any other appropriate
requirement of state law. Appropriate requirements of state law
are those that relate to water quality. States are authorized to
impose certification conditions on permits to provide reasonable
assurance that the activity will comply with CWA provisions or the
state’s water protection laws. Progress’ conditions were not only
required by CACA, but also necessary for Progress to have
reasonable assurance that the MEGS facility would comply with
water quality standards throughout the NPDES permit period
because the MEGS ash pond was substandard and presents a
heightened risk to water quality. The CWA, Congress’ intent, EPA
documents, and case law dictate that the EPA lacks discretionary
authority to review or exclude Progress’ certification conditions.
Therefore, this Court should uphold the EABs ruling that the EPA
lacks review authority and the Progress’ conditions are
appropriate.
A.

The EPA Lacks Review Authority of Progress’
Permit Conditions Because They Are a Necessary
Compliance Requirement of Progress’ Coal Ash
Cleanup Act.

EPA’s lack of discretionary authority over a state’s
certification conditions is supported by the plain language of the
CWA, Congressional intent, EPA’s promulgated regulations and
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guidance documents, and a wealth of case law. The CWA requires
polluters to obtain a NPDES permit prior to discharging pollutants
into a navigable water. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012). The NPDES
permit must include state certification that “any applicant. . . will
comply with any applicable [CWA provisions]. . . and with any
other appropriate requirement of State law. 33 U.S.C. §§ 13411342 (2012) (emphasis added). Any state certification condition
“shall become a condition on any Federal license or permit subject
to the provisions of this section.” 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d) (2012)
(emphasis added). Furthermore, section 511(c)(2) of the CWA
which precludes federal review of state certifications under the
National Environmental Policy Act, implies that federal review of
state conditions is precluded throughout the CWA, as well as
NEPA: “Nothing in NEPA. . . shall be deemed to authorize any
federal agency. . . to review any effluent limitation or other
requirement established pursuant to this chapter or the adequacy
of any certification under [section 401].” 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(2)(A)
(2012). EPA lacks review authority over Progress’ certification
conditions because the CWA does not directly give the EPA that
authority, and sections of the CWA imply that no federal review
authority exists.
The CWA was designed so that federal and state
environmental requirements could coexist, and if the EPA had
review authority over state requirements, this system of
cooperative federalism would not work. In drafting the CWA,
Congress was explicit that the purpose of the law and section 401
was to grant the states independent authority over any pollution
discharge in its waters. The goal and policy of the CWA is to
“recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities of
States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(b)(2012). In drafting section 401 to allow for state
certification of discharge permits, Senator Muskie stated: “No
polluter will be able to hide behind a Federal license or permit as
an excuse for a violation of water quality standard[s].” 116 Cong.
Rec. 8984 (1970). This reasoning is why Congress included section
401 in the CWA to allow states to allowed states to “play a major
part in the fight against pollution. . .” and provided states with a
mechanism to impose more stringent water quality requirements
on activities that may result in discharge. S.D. Warren Co. v.
Maine Bd. of Envtl. Protec., 547 U.S. 370, 386 (2006) (citing 116
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Cong. Rec. 8984 (1970)). Giving the EPA discretionary authority
over Progress’ certification conditions, would upset the purpose of
the CWA and negatively impact the CWA’s policy of cooperative
federalism.
In addition to the congressional intent of the CWA, the EPA’s
rules and guidance documents, prevent the agency from reviewing
state conditions. EPA explicitly states in rules promulgated by the
agency that “[r]eview and appeals of. . . [State certification
conditions] shall be made through the applicable procedures of the
State. . . .” 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(e) (2017). The EPA has concluded in
legal guidance to the regulated community that the “EPA has no
authority to ignore State certification or to determine whether
limitations certified by the State are more stringent than required
to meet the requirements of State law.” EPA, Decision of the
General Counsel No. 58 (March 29, 1977) (emphasis added). The
EPA may not review Progress’ conditions because promulgated
regulations prevent it from doing so, and EPA itself has
determined that it lacks the authority to review state certification
conditions in NPDES permits.
Progress’ certifying conditions are required in order to comply
with CACA, a state law; therefore, as indicated by caselaw, the
power to review these conditions lies solely in the Progress State
Court. Several Circuit Courts have held that federal agencies and
courts lack review authority over a state’s certification condition
when the condition was based on state law. Alcoa Power
Generating Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 643 F.3d 963 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding
certification conditions are generally only reviewable in state
court, but if the CWA floor is implicated, review by a federal court
is proper); Roosevelt Campobello Intern. Park Commn. v. U.S.
E.P.A., 684 F.2d 1041, 1056 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding that proper
review of state law issues is in state court); Am. Rivers, Inc. v.
F.E.R.C., 129 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the permit
issuer did not have the authority to reject state certification
conditions); Lake Erie All. for Protec. of Coastal Corridor v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, 707 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding
same); Ackels v. U.S. E.P.A., 7 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 1993) (same);
Progress relied on its state law, CACA, to impose ash pond
conditions. Therefore, the EPA and the federal court lack the
authority to review the conditions, and proper jurisdiction is in the
state court for review.

13
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The lone decision that allowed the EPA review of a state
recommendation is consistent with caselaw that does not allow
federal review of certification conditions applying state law. In
Consolidation Coal Co., Inc. v. E.P.A., the state agency
recommended a two-year permit in order to apply more stringent
effluent limitations required by the CWA. Consolidation Coal Co.,
Inc. v. E.P.A., 537 F.2d 1236, 1237 (4th Cir. 1976). This was not a
certification condition based on the application of state law. So, the
Fourth Circuit allowed agency review of the condition, where no
state review procedures existed to determine the appropriateness
of a two-year durational limitation on a NPDES permit. Id.
Further, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Consolidation Coal, was
expressly declined to follow by the Seventh Circuit, holding that
where no review procedures exist, a federal question of due process
is implicated allowing federal courts and not the EPA to review.
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 836 (7th Cir. 1977). Neither
circuit decision allows the EPA to review state certification
conditions that are based on state laws, as Progress has done in
the current case.
If this Court were to rule that EPA has review authority over
state section 401 certification conditions, it would render Congress’
intent in reserving state authority over water pollution permitting
meaningless, go against the grain of Supreme Court and Circuit
Court precedent, and invalidate longstanding EPA regulations.
Therefore, this court should uphold the EAB’s ruling that the EPA
lacks review authority over Progress’ certification conditions.
B.

Regardless, Progress’ Permit Conditions are
“Appropriate Requirements of State Law”
Because Closure and Remediation of the Ash
Pond Is a Necessary Condition for Progress to
Have Reasonable Assurance that Enerprog Would
Meet Water Quality Standards.

Regardless of this court’s conclusion on the EPA’s review
authority, the CWA, EPA regulations, and case law indicates that
Progress’ certification conditions were “appropriate requirements
of state law,” authorized by section 401 of the CWA. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341(d) (2012) (emphasis added). Section 510 of the CWA
prohibits the EPA from denying the right of the state to enforce
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pollution control stating: “Nothing in this Act shall (1) preclude or
deny the right of any State . . . to adopt or enforce . . . any
requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution. . . .” 33
U.S.C. § 1370 (2012) (emphasis added). Because Progress’s
requirements are more stringent and do not implicate the floor of
the CWA, the relevant question is whether the certification
conditions under CACA were “appropriate requirements of state
law,” which is a term defined through EPA regulations and
caselaw. 33 U.S.C.1341(d) (2012).
EPA’s regulations interpret “appropriate requirements of
state law” broadly enough to include any state requirement that is
related to water quality and not inconsistent with the CWA. The
EPA interprets the CWA to require that the state’s conditions find
that “there is a reasonable assurance that the activity will be
conducted in a manner which will not violate applicable water
quality standards.” 40 C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(3) (2017) (emphasis
added). Additionally, EPA promulgated regulations authorize the
state certifying agency to include a “statement of any conditions
which the certifying agency deems necessary or desirable with
respect to the discharge of the activity.” Id. at § 121.2(a)(4)
(Emphasis added). It cannot be argued that the requirements
under CACA were not “desirable with respect to the discharge,”
and that Progress had reasonable assurance that the continued
substandard ash pond would not result in a water quality violation.
The closure and capping of MEGS ash pond directly relates to the
current and historic discharge of coal ash (bottom and fly ash)
directly into the pond and provides reasonable assurance that
water quality standards will not be violated.
CACA’s purpose fits within the Supreme Court’s narrow
construction of “appropriate requirements of state law.” The
Supreme Court in Pud No. 1 v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology held that “at
a minimum, limitations imposed pursuant to state water quality
standards adopted pursuant to 303 are ‘appropriate’ requirements
of state law.” Pud No. 1 v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700,
713 (1994). The Court declined to cap the definition of
“appropriate” narrowly to only include state law that encompasses
water quality by determining that appropriate conditions can also
include minimum streamflow requirements for a dam operator. Id.
The Court determined that a minimum flow condition was related
to water quality enough to be considered “appropriate.” Further,
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under S.D. Warren, the Supreme Court expanded its definition of
appropriate conditions holding that the CWA requires that the
state certify that its “water protection laws will not be violated.”
547 U.S. at 373 (emphasis added).
In addition to the Supreme Court, Circuit Courts have also
read “appropriate requirements of state law” broadly. In American
Rivers, Inc., the Second Circuit Court concluded that “Section
401(d), reasonably read in light of its purpose, restricts [state]
conditions. . . to those affecting water quality in one manner or
another.” Am. Rivers, Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 129 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.
1997). Additionally, the Second Court in Roosevelt Campobello
held that, where conditions were based a state law was “designed
to primarily reduce the risk of oil spills” form a refinery, those were
appropriate conditions. 684 F.2d at 1044. The Progress CACA is
directly aimed at water quality and water protection with the
express purpose of preventing “public hazards associated with the
failures of ash treatment pond containment systems, as well as
leaks from these treatment ponds into ground and surface waters.”
R. at 8-9. Because Progress’ conditions and the purpose of CACA
directly relate to water quality, the certification condition that
closes EnerProg’s substandard ash pond fits the narrow definition
of “appropriate” as defined by the courts.
Progress’ conditions constitute as “appropriate” requirements
of state law under the broad interpretation that EPA imposes and
the narrow interpretation that the courts adopt. Therefore, in
accordance with EPA regulations, and Supreme Court decisions
the Court should uphold the EAB’s decision to reject EnerProg’s
objections to Progress’ conditions requiring closure and
remediation of the substandard coal ash pond.
II.

EPA’S POSTPONEMENT OF THE 2015
EFFLUENT LIMITATION GUIDELINES
SHOULD BE VACATEDBECAUSE THE
POSTPONEMENT NOTICEOCCURRED AFTER
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE2015 ELG RULE
AND DID NOT COMPLY WITH APA
REQUIREMENTS.

The EAB was correct to reject arguments that “effective date”
also means “compliance date.” R. at 11-12. Section 705 of the APA
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authorizes agencies to “postpone the effective date of action taken
by it, pending judicial review,” and effectively maintain the status
quo. 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2012). While “effective date” is not defined in
the statute, it has a distinct meaning from “compliance date.”
Section 705 does not on its face authorize the postponement of
compliance dates, and the phrase “effective date” has been
interpreted by other jurisdictions, and by the EPA itself, to not
include compliance dates. Furthermore, the postponement of the
2015 ELG was effectively a repeal, which is subject to notice and
comment requirements of section 551 of the APA. Allowing
postponement would also be contrary to the APA policy of
providing predictability and consistency to the public. Price v.
Stevedoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 697 F.3d 820, 830 (9th Cir. 2012).
Moreover, the EPA’s delay notice does not meet the APA’s judicial
review requirement because the postponement was not sufficiently
related to pending litigation. Therefore, this Court should affirm
the EAB’s ruling on this issue and hold that the EPA acted
arbitrary and capricious because its postponement failed to adhere
to APA requirements.
A.

Reading “Compliance Date” Into the Meaning of
“Effective Date” Under Section 705 Of the APA Is
Contrary To Congress’ Intent.

Congressional intent, an abundance of case law in other
jurisdictions, and EPA’s own use of “effective date” in rule
promulgation establish the distinction between “effective date” and
“compliance date.” EPA’s argument that the “compliance date” is
within the definition of “effective date” is not consistent with
congressional intent. The EPA’s interpretation is not entitled to
Chevron deference because the agency has not been delegated
authority by Congress to promulgate rules though 5 USC 705.
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). When
reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute, “the court must
first give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467
U.S. 837, 842 (1984). The plain language of section 705 authorizes
postponement of the “effective date,” not the “compliance date.”
Although the EPA would like this court to read “compliance date”
into the statute, the court should resist “reading words into a
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statute that do not appear on its face.” Bates v. United States, 522
U.S. 23, 29 (1997).
Case law indicates that compliance dates and effective dates
have different meanings. In a recent case where this question was
presented the court held that “Effective [dates] and compliance
dates have distinct meanings.” Becerra v. United States DOI, 17CV-02376-EDL, ___F.3d___, 2017 WL 3891678, *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
30, 2017). The Third Circuit has ruled that “mandatory compliance
date should not be misconstrued as the effective date. . . .”
Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Inv’r Fund, L.P., 51 F.3d 28, 31 (3d
Cir. 1995). The D.C. Circuit Court has also ruled on this issue
finding that section 705 only “permits an agency to postpone the
effective date of a not yet effective rule. . . not. . . suspend without
notice and comment a promulgated rule.” Safety–Kleen Corp. v.
EPA, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS, *2 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 19, 1996). In
Becerra, a federal agency sought to postpone compliance dates
after the effective date of the rule had passed because the rule was
the subject of ongoing litigation. However, the court found the
agency’s argument that the court should read compliance dates
into section 705 language unpersuasive since it would effectively
“allow the agency broad latitude to delay implementation long
after a rule was formally noticed to the public as taking effect.”
Becerra, 17-CV-02376-EDL, ___F.3d___, 2017 WL 3891678, at *9.
The fear described in Becerra, is a reality in the current case. The
EPA’s postponement in this case is well beyond the agency’s
actions in Becerra. The EPA is seeking to postpone compliance
dates in a rule that has been published since November 3, 2015,
and effective since January 4, 2016. 80 Fed. Reg. 67,837.
Even if the EPA was entitled to deference, the agency’s own
use of “effective date” in the rulemaking process suggests that
there is a difference between “effective date” and “compliance
date.” In the 2015 ELG, the EPA specifically prescribes the
“effective date” separately from enforcement dates in the final rule.
80 Fed. Reg. 67837, 67838 (Nov. 3, 2015). There would be no point
for EPA to have a stated “effective date” if each compliance date
within the 2015 ELG was independently considered an “effective
date.” This shows that even EPA had interpreted the “effective
date” unique from “compliance date” in the 2015 ELGs.
The plain language of section 705, case law in other
jurisdictions, and the EPA’s own interpretation of “effective date”
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does not allow this Court to read “compliance date” into the
definition of “effective date.”
B. The EPA’s Notice Postponing the 2015 ELG Violates
Formal Rulemaking Procedures and Arbitrarily
Changes the EPA’s Interpretation of Section 705 of
the APA.
The EPA’s suspension of the 2015 ELG after promulgation was
effectively a repeal of a rule, which is subject to notice and
comment. 5 U.S.C. § 555 (2012). The APA “ensures that an agency
will not undo all that it accomplished through its rulemaking
without giving all parties an opportunity to comment on the
wisdom of repeal.” Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d 425, 446, (D.C. Cir. 1982). In
Becerra, where a federal agency tried to postpone the compliance
dates of a rule, the court found that “after nearly five years” of
preparation leading up to the rule’s effective date, the suspension
of the rule nearly two months after its effective date “did not
merely ‘maintain the status quo,’ but instead prematurely restored
a prior regulatory regime.” Becerra, 17-CV-02376-EDL,
___F.3d___, 2017 WL 3891678, at *1, *9. Much like Becerra, the
EPA’s suspension of the compliance dates in the 2015 ELG is a
repeal in all but name. The time between the effective date and the
compliance dates in the 2015 rule was established to allow the
permitted community time to “raise capital, plan and design
systems, procure equipment, and construct and then test systems.”
80 Fed. Reg. at 67854. Since the effective date of the regulation has
passed, the industry has already been subject to the pressure of
preparing for compliance. So, a suspension of the 2015 ELG would
jolt the industry into the previous regulatory regime rather than
maintain the status quo. Even the EPA’s stated intentions in the
notice of postponement indicate that the EPA intended to repeal
the 2015 ELG. 82 Fed. Reg. 19005 (Apr. 25, 2017) (stating “after
considering the objections raised in the reconsideration petitions,
the Administrator determined that it is appropriate and in the
public interest to reconsider the Rule.”). Postponement in this case
is effectively a repeal. The EPA is asking this Court for the
authority to repeal rules outside of the normal notice and comment
requirements. It would undo all the agency has accomplished
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through rulemaking without providing the public with proper
notice or its statutory right to comment.
Other jurisdictions have recognized postponement of
promulgated rules as a repeal. The APA does not allow the EPA to;
“guide a future rule through the rulemaking process, promulgate
a final rule, and then effectively repeal it, simply by indefinitely
postponing its operative date. The APA specifically provides that
the repeal of a rule is “rulemaking subject to rulemaking
procedures.” Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S.E.P.A., 683 F.2d
752, 762 (3d. Cir. 1982). In NRDC, Inc., the EPA promulgated
rules, and then postponed them indefinitely after a change in the
presidential administration. The Court found that this
postponement failed to meet the requirements of the APA because
it effectively repealed the rule without notice and comment. Id. at
755-56. In Safety-Kleen Corp. v. EPA, the court found that section
705 “does not permit the agency to suspend without notice and
comment a promulgated rule.” Safety-Kleen Corp., 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2324. In this case, the 2015 ELG has been promulgated and
the effective date has passed. Section 705 does not permit the EPA
to postpone an already promulgated rule as the agency does in the
current case.
Furthermore, the EPA’s postponement of the 2015 ELG is
contrary to the policy of the APA to provide regulatory
predictability and consistency. The purpose of formal rulemaking
under the APA is to provide “notice and predictability.”
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168
(2012). As explained in previous subsections, the EPA’s current
interpretation of section 705 is at odds with its own historic use of
“effective dates.” In addition, as explained previously, suspension
of the 2015 ELG would restore the previous regulatory regime
rather than maintain the status quo. Allowing the EPA to
arbitrarily change its interpretation and effectively repeal the ELG
without notice and comment would negate any predictability the
APA is supposed to provide. Therefore, the EPA’s notice
suspending the 2015 ELGs is arbitrary and capricious, contrary to
law, and fails to observe procedure required by law, and the Court
must declare the notice null and void.
III.
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CWA, THE EPAHAS THE AUTHORITY TO
INDEPENDENTLY RELYON BPJ TO REQUIRE
ZERO DISCHARGE OF COALASH AND FLY
ASH, WHEN A CURRENT ELG DOESNOT APPLY
TO ALL POLLUTANTS OF CONCERN.
Regardless of this Court’s ruling on the postponement of
compliance dates of the ELG, the EAB correctly ruled that under
40 C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(3), the EPA has the authority to set
effluent limitations on a case-by-case basis for pollutants not
covered by the ELGs for an industry category. EPA regulations
specifically allow for a permit writer to regulate pollutants on a
case-by-case basis, if those pollutants were not controlled by an
ELG. 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(1)-(2). If the EPA’s 2015 ELG
postponement is deemed valid, then the EPA must rely on the 1982
ELG or BPJ on a case-by-case basis where the 1982 ELG does not
apply to certain pollutants. Because the 1982 ELG does not
regulate toxic pollutants such as mercury, arsenic, and selenium,
which are pollutants being discharged by the MEGS facility, the
EPA may rely on BPJ to require the control of these pollutants by
requiring zero discharge for bottom ash and fly ash. Therefore, this
Court should uphold the EAB’s finding that the EPA permit
writer’s reliance on BPJ was justified.
The EPA’s regulations are designed specifically to address
permitting sources, like the MEGS facility, where the applicable
ELG does not control certain pollutants in the MEGS effluent.
While the 1982 ELG obligates the EPA to include the control of
certain pollutants in a NPDES permit, it eschews the control of
other toxic pollutants such as mercury, arsenic, and selenium.
Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category; Effluent
Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards and New Source
Performance Standards, 47 Fed. Reg. 52,290 (Nov. 19, 1982).
Without 40 C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(3), the EPA would have to
abstain from requiring the control of these toxic pollutants not
addressed by the 1982 ELG. 40 C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(2).
However, relying on the authority granted to the EPA by the CWA,
40 C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(3) specifically allows the application of
case-by-case BPJ to pollutants not covered in the ELG: “where
promulgated [ELGs] only apply to. . . certain pollutants. . . other
aspects. . .are subject to regulation on a case-by-case basis.” 33
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U.S.C. § 1251 (2012) et seq.; 40 C.F.R. S 125.3(c)(3) (emphasis
added). In addition to the EPA’s BPJ authority in 40 C.F.R. 125.3,
authority also lies in the EPA’s 1982 ELG. The 1982 ELG explicitly
states, “even if this regulation does not control a particular
pollutant, the permit issuer may still limit such pollutant on a caseby-case basis when limitations are necessary to carry out the
purposes of the [CWA].” 47 Fed. Reg. at 52,302 (emphasis added).
Therefore, since the 1982 ELG did not control pollutants of concern
to the MEGS NPDES permit writer, such as mercury, arsenic, and
selenium, the EPA appropriately relied on BPJ to establish the
zero discharge requirement.
Removing the EPA’s ability to rely on BPJ to establish zero
discharge requirements would render 40 C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(3)
meaningless. EPA is required by the CWA to identify and consider
all pollutants from a source when promulgating source category
ELGs. 33 U.S.C. 1314(b) (2012). If this court interpreted “apply to”
in 40 C.F.R. S 125.3(c)(3), to include any pollutant considered in an
ELG, ELGs would automatically “apply to,” but not control, all
pollutants for a source category. This would render the situation
contemplated by 40 C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(3) that allows
regulation on a case-by-case basis, “where promulgated [ELGs]
only apply to. . . certain pollutants,” meaningless because the ELG
would “apply to” all pollutants. 40 C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(3)
implies that the EPA has discretion when promulgating ELGs to
create industry standards for some pollutants, and maintain the
authority to address other pollutants on a case-by-case basis. 40
C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(3) serves no purpose if the EPA is not
allowed to rely on BPJ where the 1982 ELG did not set controls for
specific pollutants.
“Apply to” must mean control to fulfill the purpose of the CWA.
An interpretation otherwise would create regulatory gaps where
pollutants could not be regulated if they were considered by the
ELG but not controlled. The purpose of ELGs is to carry-out the
CWA’s objective of “restor[ing] and maint[aining] [the] chemical,
physical and biological integrity of [the] Nation’s waters,” by
limiting “the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters. . . .” 47
Fed. Reg. 52,290. Not allowing the EPA permit writer to control
pollutants of concern that the current ELG does not control, would
undermine the objectives of the CWA. ELGs are not national
standards for precluding control of toxic pollutants. 47 Fed. Reg. at
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52,302 (stating that pollutants not controlled under the ELG may
be controlled on a case-by-case basis by the regulating body).
While the EPA’s regulatory language explicitly allows for BPJ
when pollutants are not covered by an ELG, an EPA manual
erroneously misinterprets the regulation. The EPA’s NPDES
Permit Writer’s Manual (Permit Manual) states that “[t]he permit
writer should make sure that the pollutant of concern is not
already controlled by the effluent guidelines. . . ,” which is
consistent with EPA regulations. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) Permit Writers’ Manual, § 5.2.3.2, at 5-45-5-46 (Sept.
2010) However, the Permit Manual then adds “and was not
considered by EPA when the Agency developed the effluent
guidelines.” Id. (emphasis added). The Permit Manual adds the
phrase “and was not considered” into the regulation, despite the
direct conflict with the express intention of the 1982 ELG and 40
C.F.R. section 125.3. 47 Fed. Reg. at 52,302; 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(3).
Where courts that have construed 40 C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(3)
to prohibit the EPA from exercising BPJ where the 1982 ELG does
not control specific pollutants, they have relied on the EPA’s
erroneous interpretation in the Permit Manual, not on established
regulations. The Supreme Court of Kentucky and an Illinois
district court both relied on the EPA’s Permit Manual to decide
when the permitting agency had the authority to issue case-by-case
effluent limitation. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ky. Waterways
Alliance, 517 S.W.3d 479, 489; NRDC v. Pollution Control Bd., 37
N.E.3d 407, 414. Both state courts concluded that because the EPA
considered the toxic pollutant at issue and “addressed it (even if
the agency had not set limits),” the permit writer was “required ‘to
refrain from imposing [BPJ] limitations and [must] instead use the
applicable [1982] ELG.’” Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ky.
Waterways Alliance, 517 S.W.3d 479, 489 (quoting NRDC v.
Pollution Control Bd., 37 N.E.3d 407, 414).
Based on regulatory language, the purpose of ELGs, and the
objectives of the CWA, an EPA permit writer may rely on BPJ in
issuing a NPDES permit that covers pollutants that are not
controlled in an ELG. Therefore, this Court should uphold the
EAB’s decision.
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NPDES PERMITTING REQUIREMENTS APPLY
TO AN ASH POND LOCATED IN A WOTUS WHEN
THE EPA VIOLATED THE APA IN EXEMPTING
SUCH PONDS, AND WHEN THE POND IS A
POINT SOURCE POLLUTANT.

In determining that the MEGS ash pond is not a WOTUS, the
EAB incorrectly relied on an EPA action that violated the APA and
also failed to understand that the ash pond is a point source
pollutant to the Progress River. Under the APA, an agency action
that has legal consequences requires public notice and opportunity
for comment on the action before it is final, except in cases where
the action is an agency interpretation or good cause exists. Here,
the EPA failed to comply with the APA because, without notice and
comment, the EPA effectively rewrote a portion of a rule, which
does not constitute as an interpretation or meet the good cause
exception. Therefore, according to APA requirements, this Court
must invalidate the EPA’s suspension, and any continuations of
the suspension, and hold that the MEGS ash pond is a WOTUS
subject to NPDES permitting requirements.
However, if this Court does not find the EPA violated the APA,
this Court should independently find that the ash pond is a point
source pollutant because of its hydrologic connection to the
Progress River. Because Fossil Creek is a perennial stream
contributing flow indirectly to the Progress River via groundwater,
any leaks into the groundwater are unpermitted discharges with
the groundwater acting as a conduit. Therefore, regardless of the
EPA’s APA violation, the Court must rule that the MEGS ash pond
is subject to NPDES permitting requirements.
A.

The EPA failed to comply with the APA Section 553
when it suspended a portion of the established
WOTUS definition in its 1980 action.

The language of section 553 of the APA and the CWA,
Congress’ intent, and case law dictate that the EPA failed to
comply with the APA in the 1980 Suspension. 45 Red. Reg. at
48620-01. When the EPA revised the definition section of 40 C.F.R
§ 122.2 to exclude ash ponds, without providing notice or comment,
it violated the APA and the CWA. The CWA explicitly states that
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public participation is required in the “revision. . . of any
regulation” and “shall be provided for. . .” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e)
(2012) (emphasis added). Yet, public participation did not occur
when the EPA revised 40 C.F.R. § 122.2.
Under 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 a manmade impoundment which
“resulted from the impoundment of the waters of the United
States” is considered a WOTUS, thus the MEGS ash pond would
have been considered a WOTUS subject to NPDES permitting
requirements. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2017). However, the two months
later, the EPA published an action effective immediately that
suspended the enforcement of this definition. 45 Fed. Reg. 4862001 (July 21, 1980). Much like a mother bird who abandons her
chicks after human touch, the EPA has abandoned the protection
of the nation’s waters that have been “touched” by human-caused
waste. However, as is the case with the chick which is still a bird
after its mother leaves, here the WOTUS is still a WOTUS even
after being subject to pollution. This indefinite suspension of the
rule did not provide notice and comment required by the APA and
the CWA. However, legal consequences flowed from this action
because polluters who chose to dispose of pollutants in an
impounded WOTUS no longer had to obtain a NPDES permit.
Furthermore, the 1980 Suspension relied on improper
authority to suspend the WOTUS rule. The suspension relies on 33
U.S.C. § 1251 as its authority. Id. However, nothing in this section
allows the EPA to change the rule without notice and comment. 33
U.S.C. § 1251(e). In fact, the CWA explicitly disallows the actions
that the EPA sanctions with this suspension. Allowing
unpermitted pollution discharges into a WOTUS simply because
an impoundment was built in a WOTUS is contrary to law because
the CWA policy is to protect the nation’s waters and govern
discharges into any WOTUS. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1342 (2012).
Therefore, the EPA violated the APA and the CWA in its 1980
Suspension by reversing the effect of a regulation without
providing for public participation.
The EPA’s 1980 Suspension fails to meet the APA’s
interpretation exception because the 1980 Suspension was
substantive not interpretive. A modification of a rule must fulfill
notice and comment requirements because it has a substantial
impact on the rights and obligations of the public. Nat’l. Retired
Teachers Ass’n v. U. S. Postal Serv., 593 F.2d 1360, 1363 (D.C. Cir.
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1979). The 1980 Suspension was effectively a modification because
it changed the requirements of the rule and had a substantial
impact on the rights and obligations of specific industries. An
agency is not allowed to use interpretation to “constructively
rewrite the regulation.” Nat’l Family Planning and Reproductive
Health Association. v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
In Sullivan, an agency directive conflicted with the explicit
language of a rule, resulting in a rewriting the rule, which the
court was an action requiring APA compliance. Id.; See also
Natural Resources Defense Council v. E.P.A., 643 F.3d 311, 320
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (where the EPA issued a guidance document that
effectively “changed the law,” thus requiring notice and comment).
Here, the EPA’s 1980 Suspension directly invalidates portions
of the rule. Like the agency’s directives in Nat’l Family Planning
and Reproductive Health Association, Inc. v. Sullivan, EPA’s 1980
Suspension directly conflicts with the regulations on their face.
The suspension changed the regulatory definition of a WOTUS.
The EPA constructively rewrote 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 when it issued
the 1980 Suspension. The result of the action was that instead of
having to obtain a NPDES permits for its pollution discharges into
a WOTUS, Fossil Creek, EnerProg could continue polluting Fossil
Creek freely. Therefore, this Court should find that the EPA’s 1980
suspension is a violation of the APA because it constructively
changed the regulation without providing the required notice and
comment.
In addition to failing to meet the interpretation exception, the
EPA’s 1980 Suspension also fails to meet the APA’s good cause
exception. To meet the APA’s good cause exception, the EPA must
determine that compliance is “either impracticable, unnecessary or
contrary to public interests.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2012). In writing
this section, Congress warned that this is not to be construed as an
“escape clause” and that the agency does not have “discretion to
disregard its terms.” S.Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 200
(1946). In accordance with Congress’ intent, the D.C. Circuit Court
held that APA exceptions will be “narrowly construed and only
reluctantly countenanced.” State of N. J., Dept. of Envtl. Protec. v.
U.S. Envtl. Protec. Agency, 626 F.2d 1038, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Similarly, in the Fifth Circuit, where the EPA made Clean Air Act
nonattainment designations without notice and comment, the
court found this did not meet the good cause exception because it
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should only be used where “delay would do real harm [and not] to
circumvent the notice and comment requirements whenever an
agency finds it inconvenient. . . .” U.S. Steel Corp. v. U.S. E.P.A.,
595 F.2d 207, 214 (5th Cir. 1979).
The EPA’s 1980 Suspension does not mention any of the
requirements for good cause under 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B). Nor does
the suspension give any other reason why notice and comment
requirements should not be observed. 45 Fed. Reg. 48620-01. In
taking such an action without notice and comment, the EPA is in
direct contrast with good cause requirements because suspending
language that would have required polluters to obtain a NPDES
permit is contrary to the public interest. Furthermore, undue harm
was not present because the WOTUS polluters were already aware
of their obligations under the EPA rule that was promulgated two
months before the 1980 Suspension. 45 FR 48620-01. Given the
narrow construction of section 553 of the APA, the EPA cannot
have fulfilled the good cause exception of the section 553 of the APA
and in issuing its 1980 Suspension, the agency violated the APA.
B.

The Court Should Alternatively Find That the
Connection Between Fossil Creek and Progress
River Makes Discharge into the MEGS Ash Pond a
Point Source to the Progress River Requiring a
NPDES Permit.

EnerProg’s substandard coal ash pond is likely still
hydrologically connected to the Progress River. Dumping pollution
into the unlined pond is equivalent to a point source directly
discharging into the Progress river. A point source is defined as
“any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance. . . from which
pollutants. . . may be discharged.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012). If
the substandard ash pond is connected hydrologically to the
Progress River, the connection would serve as a “conduit” by which
pollutants are discharged into the Progress River. Therefore, the
ash pond should be considered a point source to the Progress River,
and pollutants discharged into the pond must be subject to NPDES
permitting requirements.
Coal ash ponds leaking pollutants into groundwater are
confined and discrete conveyances discharging pollutants into
navigable waters subject to NPDES permitting requirements. In a

27

166 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 9

North Carolina district court, where allegedly unlined and leaking
coal ash lagoons located at a coal-fired power plant were conveying
pollutants into a nearby river via groundwater, the court held that
“such coal ash lagoons appear to be confined and discrete. . . [and]
[a]s confined and discrete conveyances, the lagoons fall within the
CWA’s definition of a ‘point source.’” Yadkin Riverkeeper, Inc. v.
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 141 F. Supp. 3d 428, 443-44
(M.D.N.C. 2015), motion to certify appeal denied, 1:14-CV-753,
2016 WL 6783918 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 29, 2016). In doing so, the court
was in concurrence with six other district courts who have ruled
similarly that the CWA has jurisdiction “over the discharge of
pollutants to navigable surface waters via hydrologically connected
groundwater, which serves as a conduit between the point source
and the navigable waters.” Id.; see Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of
Maui, 24 F.Supp.3d 980, 995 (D.Haw.2014); Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v.
Grabhorn, Inc., No. CV–08–548–ST, 2009 WL 3672895, at *11
(D.Or. Oct. 30, 2009); Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co. (P.R.),
599 F.Supp.2d 175, 181 (D.P.R.2009); Idaho Rural Council v.
Bosma, 143 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1180 (D.Idaho 2001); Williams Pipe
Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F.Supp. 1300, 1319 (S.D.Iowa 1997);
Wash. Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F.Supp. 983, 990
(E.D.Wash.1994).
Furthermore, CWA policy supports the court finding that
NPDES permitting is required for discharges to groundwater
hydrologically connected to navigable waters. As one court stated:
“[I]t would hardly make sense for the CWA to encompass a polluter
who discharges pollutants via a pipe. . . to the riverbank, but not a
polluter who dumps the same pollutants into a man-made settling
basin some distance short of the river and then allows the
pollutants to seep into the river via the groundwater.” N. Cal. River
Watch v. Mercer Fraser Co., No. C–04–4620 SC, 2005 WL 2122052,
at *2 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 1, 2005). Additionally, EPA regulations
dictate that NPDES permits are required for groundwater
discharges “where there is a direct hydrological connection
between groundwaters and surface waters.” 56 Fed.Reg. 64,876,
64,892 (Dec. 12, 1991).
Here, EnerProg has created the coal ash pond in the
streambed of a perennial tributary to the Progress River. A
substandard ash pond presents a heightened risk for toxic leaks
into nearby ground and surface water. The groundwater naturally
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connects the MEGS ash pond to the Progress River, and not
holding EnerProg accountable for this discharge would allow the
polluter to violate the CWA without having to get a permit. This
Court should stand with the policy of the CWA of protecting the
biological integrity of our surface waters, and find that pollution
discharges into the MEGS ash pond are subject to NPDES permit
requirements.
V.

UNDER THE CWA, SECTION 404 REQUIRES A
PERMIT FOR THE DISCHARGE OF FILL
MATERIAL INTO A PERENNIAL CREEK THAT
HAS BEEN USED AS A COAL ASH POND, WHEN
THE DISCHARGE OF FILL MATERIAL WILL
OCCUR AFTER THE CLOSURE OF THE POND.

Regardless of this Court’s ruling on the WOTUS status of the
ash pond, the EAB incorrectly held that a section 404 permit is not
required for the closure and capping plan. The CWA’s objective is
to protect and restore the Nation’s waters and in line with that
objective, restoring CWA protections to a WOTUS that was
subjected to pollution from a coal power plant is proper. Allowing
coal ash pollution to remain in a perennial tributary to a navigable
in-fact water, after that stream is no longer used as a dumping
ground, is contrary to the CWA. Furthermore, the experience of the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) with similarly situated
coal ash pond closures indicates a section 404 permit is required.
Thus, this Court must rule that the MEGS ash pond closure plan
necessitates a section 404 permit and the EPA was arbitrary and
capricious in failing to require a section 404 permit.
A.

Once the MEGS Ash Pond Ceases to be Used as a
Waste Treatment System, EPA’s 1980 Suspension
No Longer Applies, therefore the Pond Is a WOTUS
subject to section 404 requirements.

The EPA’s 1980 Suspension excludes waste treatment systems
created in a WOTUS from the definition of a WOTUS. The MEGS
ash ponds would under this definition be exempt from the
definition of a WOTUS. However, once the MEGS ash pond ceases
to be used as a waste treatment system, the exemption to WOTUS
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status no longer applies. Thus, under the CACA requirement that
the ash pond be closed, and in order to fulfill the primary objective
of the CWA to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,” the ash pond should no
longer be exempt from WOTUS status. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (2012)
(emphasis added). Because the CWA has a specific objective of
protecting and restoring the Nation’s waters, the presumption of
the statute is in favor of regulating pollution, not allowing
pollution to continue without a permit.
The EAB’s conclusion that the coal ash pond in Fossil Creek is
not subject to 404 requirements is contrary to the CWA objectives
and goals and the EPA’s regulations. Nothing in the EPA’s 1980
Suspension dictates that Fossil Creek would not be a WOTUS after
retirement of the waste treatment system is closed. In fact, the
EPA’s Clean Water Rule specifically confirms that “Tributary
streams, including perennial. . . streams, are chemically,
physically, and biologically connected to downstream waters, and
influence the integrity of downstream waters.” 80 Fed. Reg. 3705401, 37056 (June 29, 2015). The rule defines WOTUS tributaries as
those that “contribute flow directly or indirectly to a traditional
navigable water. . . [and whose] waters that science tells us provide
chemical, physical, or biological functions to downstream waters
and that meet the significant nexus standard.” 80 Fed. Reg. at
37058 (emphasis added).
The EPA’s Clean Water Rule and caselaw dictate that Fossil
Creek is included in the definition of a WOTUS because it has a
significant nexus to downstream waters. Here, the spring that
feeds Fossil Creek above the dam has not been blocked or diverted,
which means that Fossil Creek continues to flow above the MEGS
ash pond dam, and will continue to flow after the closure of the
pond. While it may appear that Fossil Creek’s flow has
disappeared, hydrologic science tells us otherwise. See Tennessee
Clean Water Network v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 3:15-CV-00424,
2017 WL 3476069, at *2-*3 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 2017) (discussing
the general principles of hydrology and finding that if “the water
passes through an area filled with pollutants—for example, a large
impoundment of coal ash waste—it may pick up some of those
pollutants and then convey them to nearby surface waters”). Fossil
Creek’s flow will continue after the closure of the dam, and will
directly contribute pollutants to the Progress River after it passes
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through the filled in pond. Therefore, once the ash pond is closed,
the impoundment in the bed of Fossil Creek still has a significant
nexus to the Progress River and, alternatively, the EPA’s
Suspension will be inapplicable because the pond will no longer be
a waste treatment system. Therefore, the MEGS ash pond must be
considered a WOTUS subject to section 404 permitting
requirements after the pond is no longer used as a waste treatment
system.
B.

Regardless, USACE’s Actions in Similar Cases
Indicates that a Plan to Discharge Fill Material
into the Fossil Creek Streambed is Subject to
Section 404 Permit Requirements.

The closure of the MEGS coal ash pond would be considered a
dredge and fill action under EPA regulations. The CWA requires
that any proposal to discharge fill material into a WOTUS be
permitted under section 404. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(2012); 33 U.S.C.
§1344 (2012). Section 404 of the CWA requires that operations
such as dredge and fill of a WOTUS be subject to USACE
permitting. Id. Fill is defined as “material placed in [a WOTUS]”
that effectively replaces the WOTUS with “dry land” or changes
the “bottom elevation of any portion of the [WOTUS].” 33 C.F.R.
§ 323.2 (2017). In this case, EnerProg’s closure plan includes the
dewatering and capping of a coal ash pond that was created in a
perennial tributary to a WOTUS. R. at 6. Because the tributary
must be considered a WOTUS as well, the dewatering of the MEGS
ash pond would be an action that replaces the WOTUS with “dry
land” which is directly covered under the 33 C.F.R. § 323.2.
Therefore, under EPA regulations, the dewatering of the MEGS
ash pond would be an action that is subject to section 404 of the
CWA.
Past decisions by the USACE with similar plans to close coal
ash ponds located in a former perennial streambed indicate that a
section 404 permit is required. In Kentucky, the USACE required
a 404 permit for Kentucky Power’s proposal that closed a coal ash
disposal pond located in an area that impacted perennial stream
channels. Public Notice of Section 404 Permit, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, ID No. LRL – 2014- 417-mdh (May 23, 2016). Kentucky
Power proposed to close the pond by capping the ash in place,
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which would have resulted in covering portions of two nearby
perennial streams. Id. Due to the unavoidable impact that closure
and filling had on nearby streams, the USACE determined that the
water in question was a WOTUS that required a section 404
permit. Proposed AEP Proposed AEP Big Sandy Fly Ash Pond
Closure - Agency Interest #2610 (April 2015). Here, EnerProg’s
closure of the MEGS ash pond has an even greater impact on a
WOTUS, than the ash pond in Kentucky, because the MEGS pond
is located in a perennial stream, Fossil Creek. Similar to Kentucky
Power’s proposal, EnerProg proposes to leave its coal ash in place,
dewater it, and cap it. The USACE’s determination in Kentucky
indicates that EnerProg’s proposal necessitates an application for
a section 404 permit. EnerProg’s proposal will result in a changed
elevation of the bottom of Fossil Creek’s streambed, and ultimately
will replace a portion of the stream with dry land. The USACE
failure to apply 404 permitting requirements on EnerProg’s ash
pond closure plan is not in accordance with past decisions, which
is arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, because the EPA’s 1980
Suspension exclusion does not apply and EnerProg’s proposed
action effectively replaces Fossil Creek with dry land, a section 404
permit is required.

CONCLUSION
EnerProg requests to avoid compliance with Progress state
law requirements and EPA regulations should not be granted by
this Court. This Court should affirm the EAB’s rulings on issues
one, two, and three. Progress has the authority to certify a NPDES
permit, without federal review, on the condition that EnerProg
comply with its water protection laws. Additionally, EnerProg
cannot avoid compliance with the 2015 ELGs mandating zero
discharge of coal ash because the EPA’s notice violates the APA,
therefore the Court should vacate EPA’s action. Further,
regardless of the EPA’s APA violation, the EPA has the authority
to rely on BPJ because the 1983 ELG fails to control pollutants of
concern. However, the Court should find that the EPA acted
arbitrary and capricious in issues four and five. The Court should
declare the EPA’s 1980 Suspension null and void because the
EPA’s action exempting the MEGS pond from CWA requirements
violates APA procedure, and, further, the ash pond is likely a point
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source pollutant to the Progress River. Lastly, due to relevant
USACE experience with similar ash ponds, the Court should shape
an equitable remedy that leaves the requirement that EnerProg
close and dewater its ash pond in place, however, remand the
specific issue of whether a section 404 permit applies to EnerProg’s
capping plan to the EPA and USACE.
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